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 Abstract 
Early in the 1990s, the introduction of economic reforms in Russia created expectations of a 
substantial reallocation of labour;  “old” jobs in the state and former-state sector were to be 
shed and “new” jobs created in new private firms.  Although the labour market experienced 
relatively heavy flows, they did not occur in the expected pattern.  Most of  the separations 
were quits rather than lay-offs and former-state enterprises continued to hire at relatively high 
rates. 
This paper takes a fresh look at the developments in labour turnover and the relationship 
between the components of labour turnover and various enterprise characteristics.  National-
level aggregate statistics are used to gain insights concerning the scale and structure of labour 
turnover in medium and large enterprises.  A more detailed examination is then made of the 
components of labour turnover and their relationship to selected enterprise characteristics 
using microdata from administrative reporting in four Russian regions. 
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Introduction 
The possibilities for labour market adjustment in transition economies are sometimes de-
scribed using a simplified model consisting of just two sectors: one with “old” jobs in the public 
sector and another one with “new” positions mostly in de-novo private firms. According to this 
model, as the transition advances, a significant portion of “old” jobs are destroyed and laid-off 
workers are pushed into unemployment, while new firms generate new jobs and pull cheap 
labour from the pool of laid-off workers.1 In the old-jobs sector, separations due to lay-offs are 
expected to increase, while hirings are greatly reduced or stopped. The growing spread 
between separations and hirings is supposed to bring significant downsizing in old firms. In 
some transition countries, such as Poland and Hungary, the reality in the early transition 
began to approach the conditions described in the model. In Russia, however, actual labour 
market developments turned out to be quite different, but with considerable variation across 
enterprises.2  
During the transition period through 1996, the separation rates at large and medium-size firms 
in Russia (including outflow from old jobs) were in fact relatively high. However, the contribution 
of lay-offs to the separations rate was minimal. Instead, separations were driven mostly by so-
called “voluntary” quits, which were often linked to deteriorating conditions of employment. At 
the same time, large and medium firms (which tend to be older firms) generally continued to 
hire substantial numbers of new personnel, replacing many of those who quit. Although the 
hiring rate was generally less than the separation rate, net employment loss still did not keep 
pace with output declines.3 Labour hoarding existed in many older firms, alongside the growth 
in employment in expanding firms. The older firms did not take full advantage of the opportunity 
that the separation rates might have provided, that is the possibility to decrease hirings and 
adjust employment more rapidly to output declines. 
The continued rather intensive hiring rates and substantial voluntary quit rates have posed a 
puzzle to analysts examining these large and medium-size enterprises. Why has labour 
turnover continued at relatively high levels and with this particular configuration? Existing 
literature recognises this issue, but does not offer a complete and convincing explanation.4 One 
of the reasons for the non-resolution of this puzzle is that researchers have faced data 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1  E.g., Aghion and Blanchard (1994). 
2 For a more general discussion of labour market development in Russia, see OECD (1997c). 
3 Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1996) note that during 1992-1995, large and medium-size enterprises in Russia faced a 
decline in output of about 50 percent, but employment in these firms declined only about 30 percent. 
4  E.g., Commander, McHale, and Yemtsov (1995); Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1996, 1997); Clarke (1998). Partial 
explanations cited for the high rates of hiring include (among others):  i) job creation, ii) fixed factors or 
technology, iii) enterprise agreements or local government requirements to hire a portion of graduates from local 
schools, iv) high proportions of very short-term matches and v) financial and political benefits of maintaining 
employment levels and the relatively low cost of retaining workers. 
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constraints, being forced to rely on aggregate statistics (which mask a portion of the variation 
across enterprise) or on relatively limited samples. 
The goal of this paper is to take a fresh look at the overall trends in labour turnover and the 
relationship between the components of labour turnover and various enterprise characteristics. 
This is done using national-level aggregate statistics and enterprise-level data recently obtained 
from the State Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation (RF Goskomstat). The paper 
focuses on large and medium-sized enterprises, with particular emphasis on four Russian 
regions. 
1. Labour Turnover: Basic Definitions and Concepts 
Labour turnover can be defined as the sum of hirings and separations during a specified interval 
(H+S).5 As noted in the OECD’s Employment Outlook (1996, p. 166), labour turnover measures 
movement of individuals into or out of jobs, regardless of whether the jobs themselves are 
newly created, ongoing (and subsequently filled by others) or whether the jobs themselves 
disappear. The data used in this paper generally measure these developments on an annual 
basis. 
Separations may be voluntary (e.g., quits) or involuntary (e.g., lay-offs). Hirings may be aimed 
at filling a vacated job or a new opening. Dividing the absolute numbers of separated and hired 
by the average annual level of employment gives the corresponding percentage rates of 
turnover. For an individual, a separation may be associated with the transition to any of the 
three labour market statuses: moving into new employment, (i.e., “a job-to-job transition” to a 
new permanent or temporary job), entering the pool of unemployed or moving out of the labour 
force. Likewise, a hiring may involve the transition of an individual from unemployment, into the 
labour force, or employment in another job. 
While labour turnover (H+S) is a measure of gross labour reallocation, the difference between 
hirings and separations (H-S) yields the net change in employment [OECD(1996), p. 165]. 
These measures can be shown as percentages of annual average employment to give an 
indication of their relative size. Labour turnover is comprised of movements due to net 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
5 Labour turnover has both positive and negative aspects, as pointed out in the OECD Jobs Study (1995, p. 66). 
Relatively high labour turnover may be associated with a better capacity of firms and individuals to adjust to 
changing economic conditions and the associated demands for labour. On the other hand, “frequent job changes 
involve a loss of job-specific skills and transaction costs for workers and employers”. Lower levels of labour 
turnover also may be associated with enhanced worker motivation and commitment to corporate goals, lower 
resistance to change (in light of a perception of employment security), and increased incentive for employers to 
invest in training their workers. However, long-term employment arrangements may create problems of flexibility 
and adjustment, especially in the face of market fluctuations. This raises a risk of labour market segmentation 
where core workers enjoy long-term employment security while other workers carry the major burden of 
adjustment. 
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employment change and “additional labour turnover". The latter includes attrition (e.g., some 
workers separate due to retirement and must be replaced just to maintain a desired level of 
employment), mismatch between labour supply and demand (e.g., due to the particular dis-
tribution of skills across the labour force in some cases two or more transitions may be 
required to achieve a one-person change in employment level), job-to-job transitions (which by 
definition involve two transitions: a separation and a hire), and friction (e.g., problems in 
scheduling that may result in a temporary hire to fill a gap in staffing pending a permanent 
hire). Thus, labour turnover includes movements of personnel beyond those which are abso-
lutely essential to arrive at a given net employment change. This excess movement is some-
times called “churning”. 
A further concept is “job turnover”, which provides information with respect to the actual work 
positions, as opposed to the number of individuals. It measures changes in the number of jobs 
(i.e., occupied positions) during an interval. In practical terms it is measured as the net number 
of jobs created in opening and expanding enterprises plus the net number of jobs lost in 
contracting or closing enterprises. Job turnover can be expressed as a proportion of 
employment to give an indication of the reallocation of working places. 
Data and Sample 
In order to provide an overview of labour turnover developments, this paper draws on aggregate 
data published by RF Goskomstat and based on the mandatory administrative reporting that is 
required of “large and medium-size" Russian enterprises.6 More detailed analysis is then 
developed based on a data set containing information from the administrative records of 
individual large and medium-size firms in four regions.7  
The administrative data are taken from the quarterly “1-T” forms filed with local statistical offices 
and containing labour market-related information (e.g., on employment, wages, and hirings and 
separations, among other issues).8 General financial and economic indicators were drawn from 
three other mandatory reporting forms (i.e., the annual “5-Z” and monthly “1-F” forms and the 
annual enterprise balance sheets). The data from these four sources were combined to obtain 
annual figures for 1996 for 6335 enterprises (see table 4 for a breakdown of the sample by 
enterprise characteristic). The administrative data cover state-owned, municipal, and newly-
privatised enterprises, public associations, and a sample of de-novo private firms. They include 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
6 These are firms employing over 100 employees in industry, construction or transportation, and over 50 in the 
wholesale trade or over 30 in the retail trade. They account for about 75 percent of total employment in the 
country. 
7 The administrative data used here generally exclude small firms, with a few exceptions probably linked to 
continued participation of small units remaining from the downsizing or break-up of large and medium-size firms. 
8 The quarterly data reported in this form are cumulative across a given year. 
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firms in industry, construction, and wholesale/retail trade from Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash 
Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Moscow City.9 
The administrative data set suffers from at least two important limitations. First, it covers only 
four regions for just one time period and it generally excludes small firms (which based on the 
experience in other transition countries might be expected to be among the most dynamic). 
Compared with the Russian averages, the regions and sectors covered tend to have moderate 
to high labour turnover. 10 Second, it also lacks information on the composition of flows by the 
characteristics of the individuals concerned. For example, the data do not indicate skill level, 
gender, age or tenure.11 Thus, analysis of the composition of labour turnover by major social or 
demographic properties remains out of scope of this study. The analysis, therefore, does not 
consider the contribution of mismatch between labour supply and demand to labour turnover.  
Major Trends in Labour Turnover 
Labour turnover in Russia has been relatively high for a transition economy (table 1). For 
example, in countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, where the speed of transition was in 
some ways comparable to Russia’s, the labour turnover rates in industry were 24 percent (in 
1992) and 32 percent (in 1993), respectively. The corresponding rate in Russia for 1993 was 
nearly 49 percent (46 percent for the total economy).12 Even in Poland, where small and 
medium-sized enterprises developed rather more dynamically and restructuring got under way 
in older enterprises at an earlier stage of transition, labour turnover in 1993 was somewhat 
lower at 46 percent in industry (42 percent for the total economy). In comparison with OECD 
Member countries, rates of labour turnover in Russia have been lower than the average, but still 
consistently higher than those of the OECD countries with the lowest rates (i.e., Japan and the 
Netherlands).13 
During the transition period in Russia, the highest labour turnover in large and medium-size 
firms was reported in 1992 amounting to nearly 50 percent of their average employment (table 
2). The largest hiring rate was also reported in that year (22.9 percent), although the rate in 
1995 was nearly as high at 22.6 percent. Separations at these firms peaked in 1994 at a rate 
of 27.4 percent of average employment. In 1996 mobility decreased somewhat compared with 
the years 1992–1995, with hirings declining to 18.9 percent of employment and separations to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
9 A short description of the regions and basic arguments for this selection is available in Lehmann and  
Wadsworth (1997). 
10 E.g., OECD (1997b). 
11  This may be important if, as is likely, these factors contribute significantly to mismatch and thereby have an 
impact on labour turnover [Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1997)]. 
12 These figures refer to large and medium-size enterprises. 
13 Comparisons with OECD Member countries are complicated by limited data availability and the lack of a 
standard unit of observation. A recent OECD article provides some insights, presenting roughly comparable data 
for nine Member countries [OECD (1996), p. 166]. 
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23.9 percent. Hirings fell more rapidly than separations. Based on preliminary partial year data, 
it seems that 1997 had an overall turnover rate close to that of 1996. 
Table 3 reports on the main characteristics of labour turnover in 1996, highlighting the variation 
across selected sectors and regions. A priori one might expect to find high separation and 
hiring rates in Moscow City where unemployment is relatively low and small business and 
private sector employment have increased, potentially pulling workers away from “old jobs” in 
the large and medium-size enterprises. Surprisingly, however, the data show higher labour 
turnover rates in Chelyabinsk (75 percent) and Krasnoyarsk (66 percent) regions, which have 
worse unemployment records and less small business development. These findings are 
consistent with labour force survey data on job tenures across these regions, which indicate 
that the rate of hirings in Moscow is lower than in all but the Chuvash Republic [Gimpelson and 
Lippoldt (1998, table 8)]. One possible explanation for this might be in the proliferation of 
multiple jobholding in Moscow which conceals and distorts the actual picture of labour market 
flows. With better opportunities for small business and new private sector employment, people 
in Moscow may be more likely to nominally retain their position with an large or medium-size 
enterprise while working elsewhere.14 
The rate of separations is relatively high in any of the examined regions (compared to the 
Russian average), but varies from 29 percent in the Chuvash Republic to 44 percent in 
Chelyabinsk Oblast. A similar situation exists across sectors in the covered regions, which 
were all above the national averages except for trade in the Chuvash Republic and trade and 
construction in Krasnoyarsk Krai. Nationally and in the selected regions construction leads, 
followed by trade and industry. Outflow from firms occurs largely through voluntary quits, which 
account for over two-thirds of all separations in industry and construction and for almost 90 
percent in trade. Against this background, involuntary separations seem to play a minor role, 
with the national average rate of lay-offs not exceeding 2 percent of employment, and the range 
in the studied sectors and regions ranging from 1.2 percent in construction in Chelyabinsk to 
4.8 percent in industry in Chelyabinsk. 
At the same time, there are substantial numbers of new hires, with firms reporting high rates of 
replacement of those separated. The regional hiring rates also exceeded the national average, 
ranging from 23 percent of employment in the surveyed firms in the Chuvash Republic to 31 
percent in Chelyabinsk Oblast. Across sectors they range from 19 percent in trade in the 
Chuvash Republic to 42 percent in construction in Krasnoyarsk Krai. Since job creation rates 
are negligible (hovering around 1 percent of actual employment), the bulk of hires goes to 
replace separations and therefore contributes to “additional labour turnover” or churning. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
14 For example, such an arrangement may be mutually acceptable to managers at large and medium-size firms 
(who avoid politically difficult lay-offs) and to the individuals (who may retain some access to social benefits from 
their old jobs, while drawing earnings – sometimes undeclared for tax purposes – from their new employers). 
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Sectoral, Ownership, and Firm Size Effects 
Table 4 presents pooled data from the regional sample highlighting the scale of labour turnover 
and its components according to sector, ownership, and firm size. The data indicate that 
industrial firms have the lowest turnover rates while construction has the highest. Construction, 
although the most dynamic of these sectors, nevertheless displays the biggest net 
employment loss (i.e., the difference H-S for construction is the largest among compared 
sectors), amounting to 15 percent of annual average employment.  Trade, in turn, has the 
lowest net loss, the lowest rate of layoffs, and the biggest rate of hiring into newly-created 
positions. 
One might expect owners of private firms (including wholly privatised firms) to use economic 
(e.g., rather than social) criteria to evaluate the performance of their firms, with the conse-
quence that such firms would be pressured into a more active adjustment in the allocation of 
labour. A previous study by the authors using household data gave a measure of support to this 
assumption, in that private firms appeared to offer less job security, but to pay higher wages 
with fewer arrears. Unfortunately, since economy property rights are usually not well-defined in 
Russia and may have little to do with a formal title, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. 
In this regard, the group of private firms in the present enterprise sample includes a mixture of 
old privatised and new private firms.15 Since most small firms are excluded from this data set, it 
is likely that the private sector segment of the sample has a significant bias towards older, 
privatised firms.16 This, in turn, can obscure distinctions across ownership types, as older 
privatised firms tend to exhibit some of the behavioural patterns found in firms with state or 
mixed ownership. 
Variation in labour turnover indicators across ownership types is also reported in table 4. The 
lowest rates of turnover are found in state and municipal enterprises, the highest ones are in 
enterprises owned by public associations and those with mixed ownership. Hirings are 
strongest in mixed and privately owned firms, while they are weakest in state and municipal 
enterprises. Separations are strongest in firms owned by public associations and those with 
mixed ownership. In terms of the net employment impact, the greatest proportional loss was in 
firms owned by public associations.17  
The data in the sample indicate that firm size is negatively associated with labour turnover, and 
hiring and separation rates. The trends would probably be more pronounced, if the sample were 
extended to include smaller firms, as these appear to have been more dynamic than larger 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
15 However, a thorough analysis of ownership effects on firms’ behaviour would require a clear-cut classification 
of ownership types, a requirement not met by the current Russian statistical system. Gimpelson and Lippoldt 
(1998) present a brief discussion of the difficulties of classifying Russian enterprises by ownership. 
16 Small firms make up less than 10 percent of the overall sample. 
17 The sub-sample for this type of firms is, however, too small (N=73) for statistically significant conclusions. 
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ones in the early years of the transition in Russia.18 As it is, the difference across firms by size 
as shown in table 4 is considerable, with the labour turnover rate among the smallest firms 
nearly twice as high as that of the largest firms. This effect may be partially attributed to 
sectoral and ownership effects as well, however, since smaller-size firms are disproportionately 
represented in construction or trade and in the private or mixed ownership categories, as 
outlined in the next section.  
Multivariate Effects 
As described above, the relationship of ownership, sector, or firm size to components of labour 
turnover might tend to conform with a priori expectations. Smaller firms, those with mixed and 
private property, and those in trade or construction are more active in reallocating workers. 
However, the effects of ownership, sector, and firm size are very closely intertwined. For 
example, trade firms tend to be smaller and private. The same may be true for construction. To 
get better understanding of how sector, ownership, and firm size affect labour reallocation, the 
analysis continues with a series of OLS multiple regressions, taking state-owned industrial 
firms in Krasnoyarsk as a reference group. Hirings, separations, quits (a major component for 
separations), and lay-offs are the dependent variables, while firm size and dummy variables for 
sector, ownership, and region are independent. The resulting regression coefficients reported in 
table 5 are generally significant, although they explain only a modest portion of variation. The 
major finding from the regressions is that, among the characteristics included in the 
regression, ownership more strongly associated with the components of labour turnover.  
In the equations, the coefficients for firm size are significant (see also figure 1). Holding all 
other things constant, smaller firms tend to have higher rates of hirings, separations, and quits. 
This effect is the strongest in the case of voluntary quitting. Both hiring and quit rates are 
relatively low in industry. By comparison, the separation rate in general is higher in con-
struction (which is linked to the relatively larger net losses in employment). Trade firms expe-
rience lower voluntary quit rates than industry, which may be related to a tendency for the trade 
firms to pay higher effective wages (in part due to the lower incidence of wage arrears and 
higher incidence of cash wage in lieu of social benefits, among other reasons). 
In comparison with state-owned firms, firms with mixed and private ownership are significantly 
more turbulent, but separations are also quite high from firms owned by public associations. 
The difference between mixed and private large and medium-sized firms in the sample is quite 
modest, probably because both types are derived largely from privatisation of old state-run 
enterprises. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
18 See Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1998) and Radayev (1996). 
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Taking Krasnoyarsk as a reference region, the regressions show that Moscow is clearly dif-
ferent from it regarding to hiring, while other regions are not. Moscow exhibits lower hirings 
activity, even though its economy is faring much better. Although the present data do not allow 
for a definitive analysis, a few explanations seem to be quite plausible. First, there may be an 
effect tied to the economic structure of the city. Many of the hirings in Moscow may go to the 
service and financial sector, and to smallest firms which are not covered by the present data 
set. Second, in Moscow the rate of secondary activity may be much higher than in other 
regions. This would conceal the actual labour market flow from statistics, as people may re-
main technically employed in a large or medium-size enterprise (possibly on unpaid or partially 
paid-leave), but draw a significant portion of their income from other employment. 
As to separations, the lowest rate is in the Chuvash Republic, but the other regions are not 
substantially different. While lay-offs play only a small role in determining labour market flows, 
the intensity of quits is quite important. Quits create labour market opportunities in that they 
often result in vacancies and may lead to mobility chains among workers. In this respect the 
Chuvash Republic, with its more rural-agricultural economy appears to offer fewer opportunities 
for labour market mobility. 
Thus, summing the most general findings for the covered firms at the time of the study, one 
can say that hirings tend to be concentrated in smaller firms and firms operating in construc-
tion and trade. These types of firms are more likely to have mixed or private ownership. 
Separations are more active in smaller firms in construction, in firms that belong to public 
associations or those with mixed or private ownership, but not those located in the Chuvash 
Republic. Quitting behaviour is more active in smaller firms, in construction and trade, in firms 
with mixed or private property, and in Chelyabinsk. 
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2. Replacements and Job Turnover 
Labour turnover, as noted in the definitions section, may be divided into two broad sets of 
forces: one associated with worker reallocation across on-going jobs and one associated with 
job reallocation.19 In other words, labour turnover includes movements into and out of on-going 
jobs as well as hirings at newly created positions and separations caused by job destruction. 
This section attempts to assess the contributions of these two broad sets of forces in relation 
to labour turnover in the four study regions. It begins by looking at reallocation connected with 
replacement of workers leaving on-going jobs and then continues with an estimation of job 
reallocation. 
Replacements 
Separations and hirings are intercorrelated. It appears that the number of separations (most of 
which are due to quitting) may be viewed as excessive by managers and is probably a major 
factor driving firms to engage in new hiring. Separations may decrease and alter the 
composition of enterprises’ human capital stocks in critical areas. Qualitative (the skills and 
occupation mix) and quantitative (the total amount of labour required to keep production going) 
shortfalls in human capital may result. In many cases, the operational requirements of 
enterprises force management to continue replacing many of those who leave. 
The relationship between hirings and separations at the time of the study can be illustrated (for 
the pooled sample) with a simple regression, as follows: H=.077+.526S (R2=.38), where H 
stands for hiring rate and S stands for separations rate. The coefficient before S reflects 
elasticity of replacement of those who have quit (i.e., the change in the hiring rate if the sepa-
rations rate changes by 1 percent). In other words, it is the responsiveness of hiring rates to 
changes in separation rates. Lower elasticity exists where there is less of a relationship 
between separations and new hires. This would imply less churning and larger net changes in 
employment than a situation where there is a higher separations rate. As noted above, new 
hires may come from job creation or from filling vacant, on-going positions. At the same time, 
separations contribute to attrition when they are not compensated by hires. Higher elasticity 
would mean that most of separated workers have been replaced. Since job creation rates in 
Russia are low (as highlighted in the next section) as are vacancy rates, lower elasticities are 
likely to be associated with higher attrition. 
The coefficient computed for the pooled sample suggests that if the separations rate increases 
by 1 percentage point, the hirings rate tends to go up by about a half percentage point. This 
means that every two separations are likely to lead to one new hire. However, elasticities of 
hirings to separations vary in their level and significance across regions, sectors and ownership 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
19  Davis and Haltiwanger (1995). 
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types. The replacement rate is highest in Krasnoyarsk Krai  
(H=-.021+.805S,  R2=.69) and lowest in Chelyabinsk Oblast (H=.207+.238S, R2=.15). With re-
spect to sectoral variation, industry has a replacement rate that is much lower than those of 
construction or trade, with the relationship between inflows and outflows in the former case 
being almost insignificant. This suggests that both hirings and separations in industry may be 
governed by other, independent factors.  
The relationship between hiring and separation rates also varies across enterprises according 
to their ownership. Firms with private and mixed ownership tend to replace three separations 
with two new hires, while those separating from firms owned by public associations are unlikely 
to be replaced. 
The significant variation in elasticities across regions, sectors and ownership types casts 
doubt on the explanation offered by Commander et al. (1995) who wrote that “[I]n effect, the 
employment decision is determined by technology, which delivers a core membership of the 
firm”. If it were so, we could expect to see highest replacement rates in industry and in state 
firms (defence-oriented firms, for example), where technology is more widely applied. Instead, 
the highest replacement is observed in smaller private firms operating in trade or construction 
which are less dependent on special skills complementary to technology. 
As suggested by Kollo (1997), there seem to be two major factors shaping employment 
contraction in state/privatised firms: (i) pulling factors (like outflow to the emerging private 
sector) affecting the most competitive workers, and (ii) pushing factors where enterprises 
concentrate on shedding the least productive workers. The latter influence has tended to lead 
to downsizing (negative net change), while the former may lead to hirings as firms are induced 
to search for replacements. The resultant new hires tend to be unstable, in part because under 
current Russian conditions, managers and workers probably face a greater lack of information 
than previously, which makes screening more difficult.20 Newcomers may come under pressure 
from pulling as well as from pushing factors that may cause them to re-separate. This re-
separation process may eventually lead to a sorting process with the least competitive being 
pushed out into unemployment or inactivity or the more competitive being matched to positions 
providing better opportunities. Still, a tendency for the average worker to have short tenure and 
low commitment increases the likelihood of the recurrent turnover.   
Job Turnover 
Table 6 shows the distribution of enterprises in the pooled sample according to the nature of 
their net employment changes. Expanding firms make up nearly 23 percent of the total 
sample, accounting for 21 percent of employment and almost one third of all hirings. Firms 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
20 E.g., see Aukutsionek and Kapeliushnikov (1995). 
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without significant net employment change (about 14 percent of all firms) are smaller in size 
and have lower overall labour turnover. They account for only 2.5 percent of total employment 
and generate only 1.0-1.5 percent of hirings and separations. Firms with declining employment 
are in the majority, amounting to two thirds of the sample and accounting for 76.5 percent of 
total employment. However, as shown in table 6, they continue to hire at a substantial rate (22 
percent in 1996); in fact, they account for two thirds of all new hires.  
As noted in the definitions above, job turnover is the sum of net job creation in new or ex-
panding firms and net job destruction in closing or contracting firms. In the study regions, job 
turnover amounts to less than 20 percent of labour turnover and is dominated by job destruction 
(table 7). Its effect on labour turnover is somewhat larger, however, than the ratio of job turnover 
to labour turnover might indicate.21 Often to fill one job slot more than one hiring is needed due 
to considerable churning and low job attachment [Kapeliushnikov (1997)]. Expanding firms may 
hire not only to fill new slots but also to replace those who have separated from recently-
created positions. This further increases hiring rates. On the whole, one separation is 
associated with 1.2 hirings in expanding firms, but less than 0.4 hirings in contracting ones. 
The Russian figures are within the range found in one recent comparison of nine OECD 
Member countries, which estimated the share of job turnover in labour turnover to range from a 
low of 12.4 percent (in France) to a high of 42.5 percent (in the U.S.), with an unweighted 
average of 28.5 percent.22 However, in a transition country undergoing far reaching structural 
adjustment, one might expect a much higher share of job reallocation. For example, although 
Poland slipped into a recession in the early 1990s, private sector manufacturing employment 
began to grow at a substantial rate in 1991 (following the far-reaching economic reforms of 
1990). The consequent reallocation of labour was reflected in a high share of job turnover in 
labour turnover. Data from one study covering 1991 imply job turnover shares in labour turnover 
of .48 for private sector firms (.44 if only continuing firms are considered) and .52 for state 
sector firms (about the same if only continuing firms are considered).23 
A time of economic restructuring might be expected to impact negatively on many of the less 
efficient, older medium and large establishments. However, in Russia, the moderate changes in 
the number of positions in contracting or expanding enterprises contrast with the relatively high 
mobility of Russian workers. For the pooled sample data, some four out of five employment 
transitions are linked to movement of individuals into or out of on-going jobs, while one in five 
transitions are due to changes in the number of jobs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
21 There is a significant dispersion across sub-samples, however, with the figure varying from .16 in 
Krasnoyarsk Krai to .32 in Chuvash Republic, from .20 in industry to .26 in trade, and from .18 in privatized firms 
to .30 in municipal enterprises. 
22 OECD (1996), p. 166. NB, these figures are rough estimates based on various data series with differing 
periods and units of coverage. 
23 Authors’ calculations.  Data from Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996). 
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Hirings, Separations, and Use of Working Time 
One might expect that the existence of underemployment in Russia would lead to more sepa-
rations and fewer hirings as firms attempt to adjust employment levels to the new economic 
conditions. The present study uses the regional data set to compute two variables reflecting 
underemployment in the form of underutilisation of potential work time: compulsory unpaid or 
partially-paid leave and short-time work. These variables are computed as: a) the number of 
person-days lost due to administrative leaves per employee (losttime1) and b) the number of 
person-hours lost due to short-time work per employee (losttime2). 
Table 8 reports on the correlations between these indicators of the use of working time, on the 
one hand, and labour turnover rates, on the other. The signs and significance of the coefficients 
hint at different types of effects associated with administrative leave and short-time work. 
Administrative leave (losttime1) influences changes in employment much more strongly. 
Increases in person-days of leave appear to stimulate separations, especially lay-offs (yielding 
the highest coefficient), and correspondingly to decrease new hires. As to the reductions in 
working hours, their effects are much weaker and not so straightforward. They affect hirings 
negatively, but also quits, although both coefficients are not very high. Surprisingly, the 
correlations between losttime2 and separations and lay-offs are not significant.  
Why do the modes of working time reduction differ so much in their effects on turnover? One 
plausible explanation concerns the sequencing or degree of measures introduced by man-
agement if the financial situation of the enterprise deteriorates. Often, the first measure is to 
introduce short-time working hours (losttime2);  this may not be considered by workers as a 
signal for exiting.24 If reductions in working hours (e.g., from 40 to 35 hours per week) prove to 
be insufficient to adjust labour to declines in output, and if the situation continues to worsen, 
managers may begin shifting workers to unpaid leaves (losttime1). This measure is more 
serious and is often associated with growing lay-offs; workers may consider it as a form of 
pressure on them to quit. Managers may stimulate voluntary separations, in part, by placing 
low-priority workers on administrative leaves, which drives up overall separations rates. A further 
adjustment measure, the use of wage arrears, is also widely practised, but unfortunately, the 
data set does not contain information on it. 
Hirings, Separations, and Wages  
The regional data set does not provide conclusive information on the relationship between wage 
levels and labour turnover. A priori, one might hypothesise either a positive or a negative 
correlation. On the one hand, an enterprise which pays relatively high wages may experience 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
24 For the early years of the transition, Clarke and his team found that employers covered by their case studies 
tended to guarantee wages and hours to their most valued employees, offered reduced hours and/or wages to a 
second tier of employees, while actively trying to separate the least valued employees. Clarke (1998), p. 43 ff. 
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lower labour turnover, for example, as the higher price reduces demand for labour and makes 
both hirings and separations more expensive (the latter due to severance pay obligations, e.g.). 
On the other hand, if higher wages reflect higher marginal labour productivity and profitability to 
the enterprise, they might correlate with higher rates of new hirings and labour turnover due to 
job creation or changes in skills mix. Alternatively, in the latter case, wage increases may also 
be associated with deep restructuring and acceleration in downsizing, with a similar positive 
correlation with labour turnover.  
Table 8 reports bivariate correlations between components of labour turnover (as a share of 
employment) and indicators of compensation and labour costs. Most of the coefficients of 
correlation are significant and negative, but not high. That is, higher wages and benefits are 
associated with lower labour turnover but the relationship appears to be weak. Moreover, the 
correlation between wages and hiring is small and not statistically significant. This may indi-
cate that higher wages are not incompatible with new hiring, a point that is developed further in 
the discussion of table 9. 
Across the pooled sample population, quit rates (the main component in total separations) 
decrease in relation to higher wage levels. However, lay-off rates also decline in relation to 
higher wages. On the one hand, at higher wage levels lay-offs become more costly because 
severance pay is linked to the individuals’ wages. On the other hand, if an increase in average 
wage reflects an increase in marginal productivity then it may also be linked with a potential for 
growing demand for labour.  
The story with social benefits costs is somewhat similar. They are negatively associated with 
separations and quits. However, they do not show a significant correlation with lay-offs. Also, 
they seem to be associated negatively with the hiring rate.25 This may be linked to the fact that 
social benefit provision would pose a significant burden on smaller, expanding firms (i.e., that 
are hiring) and so they tend to avoid or minimise this form of compensation; at the same time, 
the larger, older, state-owned, and privatised industrial firms tend to have inherited a tradition of 
social benefit provision, and some of these firms continue to hire as well. In the case of 
industry or construction, this point is also supported by the insignificant correlation between 
unit labour costs (ULC) and the components of labour turnover. 26 
Hirings, Separations, and Financial Performance  
One might expect the financial performance of firms to affect demand for labour and, therefore, 
to be reflected in hirings and separations rates. A priori, firms in financial distress might be 
thought to have low rates of hiring and, possibly, to be seeking to reduce overall employment, 
perhaps through the use of lay-offs. Is this simple logic valid in Russia? If yes, then most of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
25 Commander and Schankerman have made a similar point; see OECD (1996), pp. 115-130. 
26 The data do not permit the calculation of ULC for trade. 
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hirings and separations should be concentrated within types of firms which are significantly 
different in their financial outcomes. If not, how can this deviation be explained? 
The regional data set includes financial data only for firms in industry and construction, so this 
section will only consider these two sectors (N=2302). The available data permit calculation of 
several indicators of financial performance, including: (i) reported annual profit (or loss) per 
employee (millions Rbl) and a dummy reflecting whether the firm is a loss-maker; (ii) reported 
sales (output) per employee (millions Rbl); (iii) accumulated receivables (debts from purchases 
of products and services) both total and overdue, presented as ratios to annual sales; (iv) 
accumulated payables (enterprise debts to suppliers and creditors) both total and overdue, 
presented as ratios to annual sales; and (v) arrears and net credit position (receivables – 
payables) presented as ratios to annual sales.  
However, before presenting the analysis it is important to consider the particular caveats 
concerning any financial data from firms in Russia. A significant share of transactions are 
handled on a barter basis, which may be incorrectly valued or only partially included in the 
enterprise books.27 Also, there is significant informal sector activity which is not reflected in the 
enterprise accounting.28 Moreover, it may be that more profitable enterprises have greater 
incentives to hide a portion of their activity (e.g., to avoid taxes) than enterprises that are 
relatively worse off. Thus, the financial data are subject to a number of biases and should not 
be considered precise. 
The enterprises considered here can be divided into two broad groups, loss-making and profit-
making. According to the data, the two categories account for 32 percent and 68 percent, 
respectively, of the sampled firms. The components of labour turnover for the two groups are 
shown in figure 2. The differences in hirings between loss-making and profit-making firms (.26 
versus .23) are not statistically significant, which hints that the effect of the financial situation 
on the intensity of recruitment is not clear-cut. As noted above, loss-making firms, still hire to 
replace a portion of those separating. Profit-making firms hire replacements and, driven by the 
potential to raise profits, they may expand their personnel rosters.  
Separations, however, are differentiated across firms depending on their overall financial status 
as measured by losses or profits. The separation rates are higher for loss-making firms 
including: overall separations (.44 versus .34), quits (.31 versus .23), and layoffs (.04 versus 
.02) – though in the latter case both rates are rather low. Most separations are in the form of 
“voluntary” quits, which are more frequently observed in loss-making firms. There is a tendency 
for such firms to offer lower wages, pay wages with delay and to shift workers to unpaid leaves 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
27 EBRD (1997, p. 26) cites Russian Economic Barometer data indicating that barter accounts for some 40 percent 
of industrial sector sales. 
28 EBRD (1997, p. 74) cites data from Kaufmann and Kaliberda estimating the unofficial economy in Russia as 41.6 
percent of GDP in 1995. 
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or reduced working time. This worsening of the terms of employment, pushes many in loss-
making firms to quit. Ultimately, loss-makers are downsizing more rapidly, but still maintaining 
substantial hiring rates, which together with the elevated separation rates drive up the total 
labour turnover in this group.  
These preliminary conclusions are supported by bivariate correlations between labour turnover 
and financial indicators, which are reported in table 8. They also show that the financial 
situation of the firm does not appear to translate into particular hiring behaviours. No significant 
association between any of the calculated financial indicators and the hirings rate is detected. 
It appears that firms which are financially distressed still keep hiring new workers at rates 
approaching those which are in a better shape. At the same time, loss-making firms (as 
reflected by the “loss-maker” dummy and logprofits variables) tend to have higher outflows 
(separations). With respect to “labour profitability” (calculated as logprofit per employee), the 
level is associated only with the rates of quits, but has no statistically significant association 
with lay-offs or the total rate of separation. In the case of productivity (output per employee), 
the level is not significantly correlated with quits, lay-offs or overall separation rates. In addition, 
the correlations of arrears and net credit positions of enterprises are not significantly correlated 
with components of labour turnover.  
Table 9 shows the results of expanded multivariate regressions of labour turnover components 
on enterprise performance indicators, controlling for sector, region, and ownership. The results 
confirm the negative, but fairly modest relationship between employment (firm size) and the 
hirings, separation and quit rates, as indicated by the earlier multiple and bivariate regressions 
(tables 5 and 8, respectively). The results also confirm the positive relationship between 
productivity and hirings. Although the coefficients for the productivity variable and separations 
indicators remain negative, they are not significant in the expanded multivariate analysis 
(except for lay-offs). The coefficients for profitability and the hiring, separation and quit rates 
remain negative, but in this analysis the hiring coefficient is significant, while – surprisingly – 
the separation and quit rates are not. Thus, when controlling for other characteristics, higher 
productivity becomes associated with higher hiring rates while greater profitability is associated 
with lower hiring rates. It may be that higher productivity creates shop floor pressures for firms 
to hire. At the same time, the reduced hiring associated with higher profitability may be linked 
to past restructuring efforts, which are not reflected in the present data set. 
A key difference between the expanded multivariate analysis and the earlier analysis is the 
relationship of wages to the turnover components. Controlling for sector, region, and ownership, 
the coefficients for hirings, separations, and quits change sign (becoming positive). The 
coefficient for hirings becomes strong and significant, while the coefficients for separations and 
quits are relatively weak and not significant. Thus, firms engaging in greater hiring activity 
appear to be paying higher wages. This may be partly a supply-related development, whereby 
some expanding firms offer higher wages to attract sufficient number of satisfactory workers. It 
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may also be that within industry there are branch-specific labour issues that would account for 
part of the variation. The regressions give an impression of more productive firms paying higher 
wages and thereby increasing costs and leaving lower profit margins. Unfortunately, these 
hypotheses cannot be tested using the current data set. 
Perhaps the main point that can be gleaned from table 9 is that the enterprise performance 
variables have some significant impact on indicators of labour turnover, but this is relatively 
modest in scope. Much of the variation appears to be explained by other factors. In each 
equation at least one of the control variables has a greater weight than the enterprise per-
formance variables, with the exception of the logwage variable which has a relatively strong 
association with hirings. It may be that financial factors influence hiring and separation deci-
sions indirectly, depending in part on the type of ownership and management that an enterprise 
has. These decisions may largely be driven by managers and their perceptions of a range of 
factors including financial factors, but also possibly depending on other factors such as the 
political or social environment. The latter points are probably linked, for example, to the low 
incidence of lay-offs. A further consideration might be the institutional inertia in older firms, 
whereby the human resources management is sometimes conducted through separate 
channels from the financial management of the firm. 
3. Conclusions 
The present analysis confirms certain unique features of labour turnover among large and 
medium enterprises in the Russian Federation, particularly in the four study regions. The 
relatively high rates of turnover and its components – notably the hiring rate – continued 
through the initial years of the transition. In 1996, there was some deceleration in these rates, 
but they remained relatively elevated. Moreover, the separations rate in Russia has been largely 
driven by voluntary quitting (although this voluntary quitting is also associated with deterioration 
in the terms of employment, particularly the use of unpaid or partially-paid leaves).  
The available data do not permit a resolution of the puzzle of the persistent hirings, but they do 
help to characterise it and provide some indications that may be useful in the development of 
hypotheses (table 10). According to this limited sample, the hiring rates are greater in smaller 
firms, less profitable firms, firms in construction and trade, and firms with mixed ownership. 
They tend to be higher in more productive firms and those that pay higher wages, as well as 
those that have lower underemployment in the form of administrative leaves. 
Separation rates are greatest in smaller firms, less profitable firms, construction firms, and 
firms owned by public associations and to a lesser extent those with mixed ownership. They 
tend to be higher in firms that are less productive, paying lower wages, as well as those that 
have more underemployment. The data indicate that voluntary quits tend to be even more 
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concentrated in firms with such characteristics, with mixed ownership firms having particularly 
elevated levels. 
The results indicate a tendency for such factors as firm size and sector, location, ownership, 
employment conditions, and financial performance each to be related to the extent and com-
position of labour turnover. However, the influence of any single factor appears to be relatively 
modest. The weak association of financial indicators with the components of labour turnover is 
particularly surprising and merits further investigation and confirmation – especially in light the 
of the potential for distortions in the reporting on these matters.  
Clearly, these points are tentative and require additional information to be confirmed. In view of 
the limited coverage and geographic scope of the regional data set, as well as its lack of a 
dynamic perspective and historical information, any conclusions should be treated with cau-
tion. Moreover, a more comprehensive study would require that additional variables be taken 
into account. In particular, much about the internal institutional, social, and political workings of 
enterprises is absent from the data set – information that in some cases is difficult to collect 
except through a case study approach. Nevertheless, the regional data set utilised in the 
present analysis has permitted inquiry concerning aspects of labour turnover that are not 
covered by the national-level data and, consequently, provides potential to better understand 
labour turnover under recent Russian circumstances. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures  
Table 1: Labour turnover in selected transition and OECD Member Countries 
(percentages) 
 Hirings Separations Turnover (H+S) 
Bulgaria (1993)a    
Total 
Industry 
10.8 
10.1 
20.8 
21.7 
31.6 
31.8 
    
Hungary (1988)b    
Total 
Industry 
10.7 
21.6 
11.3 
19.4 
22.0 
41.0 
    
Poland (1992)c 
Total 
Industry 
(1993) 
Total 
Industry 
 
17.9 
21.6 
 
20.6 
25.0 
 
22.4 
17.1 
 
21.0 
20.7 
 
40.3 
38.7 
 
41.6 
45.7 
    
Romania (1992)d 
State-sector employees 
Industry 
 
  5.4 
5.2 
 
18.4 
17.7 
 
23.8 
23.9 
    
Russia (unweighted average 1992-95)    
Total 
Industry 
21.9 
20.4 
26.3 
29.3 
48.2 
49.7 
    
Selected OECD Countries:    
    
Japan (continuing establishments 1988-92)e 18.0 18.6 39.1 
    
Netherlands (continuing firms, 1988-1990)e 11.9 10.1 22.0 
Sources: a.  Bulgarian Statistical Yearbook, 1994; 
b.  Hungarian Statistical Reference Book, 1988; 
c.  Commander and Coricelli (1995), p. 96 (the Russian edition); 
d.  Earle and Oprescu in Commander and Coricelli (1995), pp. 326 and 328; 
e.  OECD (1996), p. 166. 
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Table 2:  Labour turnover in Russia: large and medium-size firms, 1992–97 
(national-level data) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997,Q1-3 
Hirings (H) 22.9 21.1 20.8 22.6 18.9 14.0 
Separations (S) 26.9 25.1 27.4 25.7 23.9 17.5 
Turnover  (H+S) 49.8 46.2 48.2 48.3 42.8 31.5 
Net Employment  
  Change  (H-S)  
-4.0 -4.0 -6.6 -3.1 -5.0 -3.5 
Source: RF Goskomstat 
 
Table 3:  Labour turnover characteristics in selected regions and sectors, 1996 
(ratios to total employment) 
 Hirings Separations H+S H-S New 
jobs 
Quits Lay-offs 
Chelyabinsk Oblast* .312 .437 .749 -0.125 .010 .336 .029 
= industry .246 .373 .619 -0.127 .006 .235 .048 
= construct .413 .491 .904 -0.078 .009 .330 .012 
= trade 
 
.304 .454 .758 -0.150 .013 .414 .025 
Chuvash Republic* .233 .292 .525 -0.059 .012 .241 .022 
= industry .256 .275 .531 -0.019 .013 .221 .024 
= construct .273 .417 .690 -0.144 .012 .333 .013 
= trade .187 .256 .443 -0.069 .012 .223 .023 
        
Krasnoyarsk Krai* .284 .377 .661 -0.093 .009 .266 .032 
= industry .253 .368 .621 -0.115 .008 .262 .032 
= construct .422 .509 .931 -0.087 .005 .322 .013 
= trade .224 .295 .519 -0.071 .013 .233 .044 
        
Moscow City* .270 .376 .646 -0.106 .009 .295 .026 
= industry .190 .330 .520 -0.140 .006 .296 .035 
= construct .234 .432 .666 -0.198 .006 .210 .037 
= trade .325 .373 .698 -0.048 .012 .336 .017 
        
Russia (all sectors)  .189 .239 0.428 -0.05 n.a. .160 .020 
= industry .169 .270 0.439 -0.101 n.a. n.a. .032 
= construct .290 .425 0.715 -0.135 n.a. n.a. .031 
= trade .256 .345 0.601 -0.089 n.a. n.a. .036 
*  weighted average for three sectors shown (regional totals) 
n.a.–not available 
Source:  Authors’ calculations; RF Goskomstat data from administrative reporting of large and medium-size enter-
prises, selected regions (Moscow City, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai). 
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Table 4:  Labour turnover characteristics by ownership types, firm size, and sectors, 
1996 
(ratios to annual average employment) 
 Hirings Separations H+S H-S New jobs Quits Lay-offs Number of 
observations 
Ownership         
State .195 .281 .476 -.086 .008 .199 .015 1261 
Municipal .199 .273 .472 -.074 .008 .222 .010 582 
Public 
  associations 
.260 .534 .794 -.274 .006 .300 .026 73 
Mixed .332 .436 .768 -.104 .011 .374 .006 1727 
Private .276 .389 .665 -.113 .008 .255 .008 2686 
         
Firm Size         
< 21 .303 .437 .740 -.134 .022 .321 .043 585 
21-50 .291 .380 .671 -.089 .009 .335 .023 1725 
51-100 .312 .418 .730 -.106 .011 .337 .027 1187 
101-200 .277 .391 .668 -.114 .009 .291 .030 1140 
201-500 .249 .335 .584 -.086 .006 .229 .024 968 
501-2,000 .205 .308 .513 -.103 .005 .186 .028 567 
2,001-5,000 .163 .275 .438 -.112 .004 .155 .029 102 
> 5,000 .166 .243 .409 -.077 .003 .122 .014 61 
         
Sector         
Industry .225 .339 0.564 -0.114 .008 .229 .035 1986 
Construction .307 .457 0.764 -0.15 .007 .310 .026 1452 
Trade .296 .366 0.662 -0.07 .012 .325 .023 2897 
         
Total sample .28 .38 .66 -.10 .01 .29 .03 6335 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations; RF Goskomstat data from administrative reporting of large and medium-size enter-
prises, selected regions (Moscow City, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai). 
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Table 5:  Multivariate regressions of labour turnover components on firm size, sector,  
ownership, and region, 1996 
(N=6,357) 
 Hirings Separations  Quits Lay-offs 
     
Firm Size -4.49E-06* 
(-1.82) 
-6.34E-06**  
(-2.22) 
-6.62E-06*** 
(-2.91) 
-7.36E-07 
(-.87) 
     
Industry 
 
... ... ... ... 
Construction .07*** 
(4.86) 
.02*** 
(6.03)  
   .07*** 
(4.65) 
-.006 
(-1.19) 
Trade .05*** 
(3.43) 
-.01 
(-.60) 
-.04*** 
(-3.00) 
-.008 
(-1.49) 
     
State ... ... ... 
 
... 
Municipal .003 
(.15) 
.03 
(.99) 
.03 
(1.28) 
.0008 
(.10) 
Public Association .09 
(1.64) 
.27*** 
(4.48) 
.12** 
(2.41) 
.13*** 
(7.00) 
Mixed    .9*** 
(5.46) 
.10*** 
(5.21) 
.7*** 
(4.28) 
.006 
(1.10) 
Private .12*** 
(7.96) 
.16*** 
(9.00) 
.16*** 
(11.26) 
.0002 
(.03) 
     
Krasnoyarsk  
 
... ... ... ... 
Chelyabinsk -9.35E-04 
(-.051) 
.03 
(1.30) 
.03* 
(1.93) 
-.003 
(-.41) 
Chuvash Republic -.03 
(-1.54) 
-.06** 
(-2.58) 
-.01 
(-.44) 
-.011 
(-1.54) 
Moscow -.03** 
(-2.03) 
-.01 
(-.62) 
.01 
(.58) 
-.004 
(-.87) 
     
Constant 
 
.18*** 
(9.70) 
.27*** 
(12.5) 
.16*** 
(9.47) 
.03*** 
(5.26) 
Adj. R2 .02 .03 .04 .008 
*  p<.0.1; 
** p<.0.05;  
*** p<0.01; 
 t-values are in parentheses. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations; RF Goskomstat data from administrative reporting of large and medium-size enter-
prises, selected regions (Moscow City, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai). 
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Table 6:  Components of labour turnover and enterprises grouped by net change in 
employment, 1996 (pooled sample) 
 Hiring 
rates 
(H) 
Separation 
rates 
(S) 
Quit 
rates 
Lay-off 
rates 
Share of 
firms in 
sample 
Share of  
hirings in 
sample 
Share of  
separations 
in sample 
Share of total 
employment in 
sample 
All firms .276 .378 .292 .027 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Expanding 
  firms (H>S)  
.517 .316 .267 .010 22.8% 31.9% 15.5% 21.0% 
         
No net change  
  (H=S)  
.135 .135 .099 .001 14.2% 1.5% 1.0% 2.5% 
         
Contracting 
  firms (H<S)  
.220 .455 .343 .040 63% 66.5% 83.5% 76.5% 
Source:  Authors’ calculations; RF Goskomstat data from administrative reporting of large and medium-size enter-
prises, selected regions (Moscow City, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai). 
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Table 7:  Job turnover and labour turnover, 1996 
(ratio to average annual employment) 
 Job creation 
rate (JCR) 
Job destruction 
rate (JDR) 
Gross 
(JCR+JDR)  
Net 
(JCR-JDR)  
Excess 
(JCR-/JDR/) 
H+S Job turnover/ 
labour turnover 
        
Total 0.019 0.111 0.129 -0.091 0.038 0.66 0.195 
        
Region        
Moscow 0.019 0.122 0.141 -0.103 0.038 0.646 0.218 
Krasnoyarsk 0.017 0.087 0.104 -0.069 0.034 0.661 0.157 
Chelyabinsk 0.018 0.102 0.121 -0.084 0.037 0.749 0.161 
Chuvash 0.027 0.139 0.166 -0.113 0.053 0.525 0.316 
        
Sector        
Industry 0.015 0.096 0.112 -0.081 0.031 0.564 0.198 
Construct 0.018 0.142 0.160 -0.124 0.035 0.764 0.209 
Trade 0.044 0.127 0.172 -0.083 0.089 0.662 0.259 
        
Ownership        
State 0.018 0.097 0.115 -0.080 0.035 0.476 0.242 
Municipal 0.029 0.112 0.140 -0.083 0.057 0.472 0.298 
Public 
Association 
0.014 0.143 0.157 -0.129 0.028 0.794 0.197 
Mixed 0.020 0.119 0.139 -0.099 0.040 0.768 0.182 
Private 0.025 0.132 0.156 -0.107 0.049 0.665 0.235 
        
Employment        
<20 0.083 0.211 0.294 -0.127 0.167 0.74 0.397 
21-50 0.051 0.134 0.185 -0.083 0.101 0.671 0.275 
51-100 0.050 0.160 0.210 -0.110 0.100 0.73 0.287 
101-200 0.035 0.147 0.182 -0.112 0.070 0.668 0.273 
201-500 0.032 0.119 0.151 -0.087 0.063 0.584 0.258 
501-2000 0.025 0.128 0.152 -0.103 0.049 0.513 0.297 
2001-5000 0.008 0.125 0.132 -0.117 0.016 0.438 0.302 
>5000 0.008 0.079 0.087 -0.072 0.015 0.409 0.213 
Source:  Authors’ calculations; RF Goskomstat data from administrative reporting of large and medium-size enter-
prises, selected regions (Moscow City, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai). 
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Table 8:  Bivariate correlations: enterprise performance and components of labour 
turnover, 1996 
(pooled data for selected regions) 
Indicators Hirings Separations Quits Lay-offs 
     
Employment     
Net change/Empl .2985*** -.5713*** -.4056*** -.4949*** 
Lognetemployment  .3708*** .1344*** .0981*** .0541** 
Log(netemp./emp.) .6337*** .2425*** .2668*** .0794*** 
Employment -.0294** -.0291** -.0503*** -.0063 
Logemployment -.0701*** -.0728*** -.1267*** -.0138 
     
Financial and Output      
logoutput per employeea .0348* -.0482** -.0683*** -.0602*** 
Output per employeea -.0143 -.0163 -.0161 -.0021 
logprofit per employeea  .0002 -.0394 -.0524* -.0089 
logprofit, total a -.0179 -.0802*** -.1036*** -.0148 
Loss-maker (1/0) a,c .0271 .0908*** .0891*** .0495** 
Arrears a,b .0144 .0025 .0016 .0116 
Net credit position a,b -.0296 -.0228 -.0188 -.0116 
Receivables, total .0306 .0262 .0208 .0329 
Receivables, overdue -.0070 .0050 .0005 .0086 
Payables, total .0298 .0232 .0191 .0336 
Payables, overdue -.0139 -.0011 -.0013 -.0081 
     
Underemployment     
Administrative  leave (Losttime1) -.0457*** .0836*** .0641*** .1038*** 
Short-time working (Losttime2)  -.0365*** -.0170 -.0242* .0173 
     
Compensation and  
  Labour Costs 
    
logwage -.0038 -.0809*** -.1163*** -.0520*** 
Monthly average wage -.0111 -.0819*** -.1192*** -.0369*** 
Social benefits per employee -.0234* -.0378*** -.0510*** .0058 
ULC (wage fund/output per empl) a .0225 .0158 .0093 .0317 
* p<.1; **-p<.05; ***-p<.01; 
a - construction and industry; 
b - net credit arrears 1: net amount overdue/sales; net credit position 2: net (receivables-payables)/sales; 
c - if a loss-maker: 1, otherwise: 0 
Source:  Authors’ calculations; RF Goskomstat data from administrative reporting of large and medium-size enter-
prises, selected regions (Moscow City, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai). 
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Table 9: Multivariate regressions of labour turnover components on enterprise 
performance variables, controlling for sector, region, and ownership, 1996 
 Hirings Separations Quits Lay-offs 
     
constant -.339** 
      (-2.31) 
      .507*** 
      (2.95) 
  .404** 
     (2.51) 
      .054*** 
      (2.66) 
     
logwage     .179*** 
    (3.51) 
.005 
      (.08) 
.013 
   (.24) 
-.008 
        (-1.17) 
logproductivity 
  (output per employee)  
  .066** 
    (2.24) 
-.004 
     (-.12) 
-.007 
     (-.21) 
  -.008* 
         (-1.81) 
logprofitability    -.062*** 
     (-3.53) 
-.028 
      (-1.36) 
-.028 
      (-1.46) 
 .004 
        (1.50) 
logemployment -.036*   
     (-1.84) 
  -.085*** 
      (-3.69) 
     -.091*** 
      (-4.21) 
-.004 
         (-1.41) 
     
Sector     
     
Industry (1/0)    -.058** 
    (-.058) 
  -.125*** 
      (-4.55) 
  -.108*** 
      (-4.20) 
  .007* 
        (2.11) 
     
Region     
     
Krasnoyarsk (1/0) ... ... ... ... 
     
Chelyabinsk (1/0)    .070** 
     (1.98) 
 .027 
      (.64) 
.030 
    (.79) 
-.005 
         (-1.05) 
Chuvash Republic (1/0)   .080* 
     (1.95) 
-.047 
      (-.98) 
-.002 
     (-.05) 
-.009 
         (-1.54) 
Moscow (1/0) .038 
     (1.22) 
    .073** 
      (2.00) 
  .063* 
     (1.82) 
 .007 
      (1.61) 
     
Ownership     
     
State (1/0) ... ... ... ... 
     
Mixed (1/0)     .063** 
     (2.37) 
         .120*** 
        (3.82) 
       .078*** 
       (2.65) 
   .011* 
      (3.00) 
Municipal (1/0) .062 
     (1.18) 
  .041 
      (.67) 
.027 
     (.48) 
.007 
     (.09) 
Private (1/0)        .090*** 
      (2.84) 
       .133*** 
      (3.60) 
      .107*** 
       (3.09) 
.005 
      (1.19) 
Public Association  (1/0)   .020 
    (.27) 
-.021 
      (-.24) 
-.024 
      (-.29) 
.003 
     (.04) 
     
Adjusted R2 .03 .04 .04 .02 
* p<.0.1; ** p<.0.05; *** p<0.01; T-statistics shown in brackets. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations; RF Goskomstat data from administrative reporting of large and medium-size enter-
prises, selected regions (Moscow City, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai). 
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Table 10:  Enterprise characteristics associated with selected components of labour  
turnover 
I.  Based on groups with greatest ratios to total employment 
Indicator Hiring rates are 
greatest in ... 
Separation rates are 
greatest in ... 
Quit rates are 
greatest in ... 
Firm size smaller firms smaller firms smaller firms 
    
Loss/Profit-making 
firms 
loss-makers loss-makers loss-makers 
    
Regions Chelyabinsk Chelyabinsk Chelyabinsk 
    
Sectors construction  
and trade 
construction trade and 
construction 
    
Ownership mixed public association mixed 
    
II.  Tendencies (based on correlation and regression analyses) 
Variable Hiring rates tend to be 
greater in firms that are 
... 
Separation rates tend 
to be greater in firms 
that are ... 
Quit rates tend to be 
greater in firms that 
are ... 
Size smaller  smaller  smaller  
    
Profitability less profitable? less profitable? less profitable? 
    
Productivity more productive less productive? less productive? 
    
Labour utilisation lower underemploy-
ment (administrative 
leave)? 
higher underemploy-
ment (administrative 
leave)? 
higher underem-
ployment 
(administrative 
leave)? 
    
Wage structure higher paying? lower paying? lower paying? 
Note:  Entries without a “?” were confirmed through both the correlation and regression analysis, the others by 
only one form of analysis. 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations; RF Goskomstat data from administrative reporting of large and medium-size enter-
prises, selected regions (Moscow City, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai). 
 
I H S — Gimpelson and Lippoldt / Labour Turnover in Russia — 27 
Figure 1:  Characteristics of labour turnover, by firm size, 1996 
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Source:   Authors’ calculations; RF Goskomstat data from administrative reporting of large and medium-size enter-
prises, selected regions (Moscow City, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai). 
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Figure 2:  Components of labour turnover, by type of enterprise, 1996 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations; RF Goskomstat data from administrative reporting of large and medium-size enter-
prises, selected regions (Moscow City, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai). 
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